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Crawford: Crawford: Going Dutch

Going Dutch: Should Employees
Have to Split the Costs of Arbitration

in Disputes Arising from Mandatory
Employment Arbitration Agreements?
Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION

Employers often require their employees to sign arbitration agreements as a
condition of employment, obligating employees to submit their disputes with employers to binding arbitration. These agreements may include terms, such as costsplitting provisions, that may be advantageous to the employer, but extremely
limiting to an employee seeking to enforce her statutory rights. The United States
Supreme Court has yet to set out a clear position about whether an employee, by
signed agreement, can be required to pay all or part of the arbitration fees and
costs when the employee submits a statutory claim to arbitration. Federal district
courts have set out different standards, but there has yet to be a consensus in approaches to the issue. In the instant case, the Sixth Circuit closely examines the
different approaches to determining whether cost-splitting provisions in mandatory arbitration agreements are enforceable and then sets forth its own standard.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ordered the consolidation of two cases 2 in order to address the enforceability of cost-splitting
provi3
sions of mandatory arbitration agreements in employment contracts.
A. Morrisonv. Circuit City Stores, Inc.4
On July 10, 1995, Lillian Pebbles Morrison (Morrison) applied for a managerial level position at a Circuit City Stores, Inc., (Circuit City) store in Cincinnati,
Ohio. 5 As a condition of employment, Circuit City required potential employees
to sign a document entitled "Dispute Resolution Agreement," which contained an
arbitration clause requiring any and all legal disputes relating to employment with
Circuit City to be settled in an arbitral forum. 6 The arbitration clause required that

1. 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003).
2. See Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 815 (S.D. Ohio 1999); Shankle v. Pep
Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc., No. 99-5891 (M.D. Tenn. June 1, 1999).
3. Morrison, 317 F.3d at 652.
4. See id. (citing Morrison,70 F. Supp. 2d. 815).
5. Id. at 654.
6. Id.
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all arbitration proceedings follow "Circuit City Dispute Resolution Rules.",7 Rule
Four of the agreement required any employee filing an arbitration claim to initiate
arbitration proceedings and pay a seventy-five dollar filing fee within one year
from the time the employee became aware or should have became aware of the
facts giving rise to a claim.8 Rule Thirteen required Circuit City to pay all initial
costs of the arbitration, but then required each party to split the costs equally following an arbitration award. 9 Additionally, pursuant to Rule Thirteen of Circuit
City's rules and procedures, each party was responsible for its own attorney fees,
unless the arbitrator used her discretionary power to award reasonable attorney
fees to one party.' 0
On or about December 1, 1995, Morrison began her employment with Circuit
City and was terminated two years later, on December 12, 1997. l On December
11, 1998, Morrison filed a lawsuit in Ohio state court alleging federal and state
claims of race and sex discrimination (violations of Ohio public policy), as well as
promissory estoppel. 12 Circuit City had the case removed to federal court and
moved to dismiss Morrison's claims and compel arbitration. The federal district3
court granted Circuit City's motion and issued an order compelling arbitration.'
Morrison appealed the district court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, but was forced to participate with Circuit City in arbitration proceedings in April 2000.14 On July 14, 2000, the arbitrator issued an
award that was not challenged by either Morrison or Circuit City. 15 Because Morrison failed to object to the award, Circuit City filed a motion with the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to dismiss Morrison's appeal as
moot.' 6 This motion was denied on January 17, 2002.17
B. Shankle v. Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc. 18
Mark F. Shankle (Shankle) started working at Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack,
Inc. (Pep Boys) on January 25, 1997.'9 As a condition of employment, Pep Boys
required employees to sign a "Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims., 20 This

7. Id. These rules addressed many issues, including time limitations for filing, limitations on
remedies available to the employee, allocation of arbitration costs, and filing fees. Id. (citing Circuit
City Dispute Resolution Rules and Procedures,Joint Appendix at 129).
8. ld (citing Circuit City Dispute Resolution Rules and Procedures,Joint Appendix at 129).
9. Id. (citing Circuit City Dispute Resolution Rules and Procedures,Joint Appendix at 134). However, the arbitrator may use her discretion and require the losing party to pay all arbitration costs. Id. at
654-55.
10. Id. at 654 (citing Circuit City Dispute Resolution Rules andProcedures,Joint Appendix at 134).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 655-56.
13. Id. at 656.
14. Id.

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See id. (citing Shankle v. Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc., No. 99-5891 (M.D. Tenn. June 1,
1999)).
19. ld at 656.
20. Id.
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agreement provided that each party would equally share all arbitration costs and
fees. 21 After quitting his job with Pep Boys on May 21, 1998, Shankle initiated
arbitration proceedings against Pep Boys on August 4, 1998, in order to obtain
severance pay. 22 On September 3, 1998, Shankle attempted to withdraw his arbitration claim and then filed a suit in a Tennessee state court alleging Title VII
violations.23 On November 6, 1998, Pep Boys removed the suit to federal district
24
court and moved to stay the litigation pending the outcome of the arbitration.
On June 1, 1999, Pep Boys' motion was denied and the district court granted
Shankle's motion to stay the arbitration. 25 The court held that the cost-splitting
provision in the arbitration agreement was invalid and unenforceable. 26 Pep Boys
filed a timely notice of appeal and the case was argued in front of an appellate
hearing panel on June 16, 2000.27 On October 17, 2001, the court issued an order
for rehearing en banc.28
C. Consolidationof Morrison and Shankle
On March 20, 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
held a consolidated rehearing of Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc. and Shankle
v. Pep-Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc. 29 After a rehearing en banc of the two
cases, the appellate court held the cost-splitting provisions in each case unenforceable. 30 The court also held that potential litigants must be given an opportunity,
prior to arbitration on the merits, to demonstrate that the potential costs of arbitration would be so high as to deter them, or similarly situated potential litigants,
from seeking to vindicate their statutory rights through arbitration. 3'

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925 was an attempt
to reverse longstanding judicial aversion to arbitration agreements. 32 Section Two
of the FAA provides that a "written provision in any ...

contract ...

shall be

valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds that exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract." 33 Since the enactment of the FAA, the
Supreme Court has ruled that statutory rights may be subject to mandatory arbitra-

21. Id. at 657.
22. Id. at 656-57.
23. Id. at 657.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.at 663.
31. Id. The court affirmed the district court's decision in the Morrison case to compel arbitration
because Morrison was not required to pay any arbitration costs. The court affirmed the district court's
decision in the Shankle case with respect to the unenforceability of the cost-splitting provision and
reversed and remanded the decision on other grounds. Id.at 675-80.
32. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
33. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
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tion if the parties' rights can be effectively vindicated in an arbitral forum. 34 In
Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., the Supreme Court clarified that "[b]y
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than
a judicial, forum." 35 Gilmer did not, however, specifically address the issue of
whether cost-splitting provisions in arbitration agreements between an employee
and an employer are enforceable.36 Courts have not yet reached a consensus on
whether a cost-splitting provision in an arbitration agreement allows an employee
to have her rights effectively vindicated in an arbitral forum. 37 Courts have
adopted several different approaches to resolving the cost-splitting issue.38
A. Per Se Denial of Statutory Rights
One approach, adopted by the Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, views costsplitting provisions in arbitration agreements as a per se denial of an employee's
statutory right to have her claim vindicated in an effective forum. 39 These courts
have ruled that an employee raising a statutory claim can never be required, as a
condition of the contract, to pay for an arbitrator's fee when attempting to resolve
such a claim because arbitration should be "a reasonable substitute for a judicial
forum.- 40 When accessing the judicial forum, litigants pay only the costs of court
filing fees, without the additional cost of hiring a judge.4' On the other hand,
hiring an arbitrator can range from $500 to $1,000 or more per day.42 These costs,
in addition to administrative and attorney's fees, can add up to huge amounts that
would most likely deter an individual, especially an unemployed former employee, from pursuing her statutory claims through arbitration.43 Therefore, courts
using this approach have ruled that all administrative fees associated with arbitration, including the arbitrator's compensation, should be paid by the employer
alone and any cost-splitting provisions in which the employer does not pay all the
costs will be per se invalid because it does not provide a reasonable substitute for
a judicial forum. a

34. Morrison, 317 F.3d at 658.
35. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
36. See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20.
37. Clara H. Saafir, Comment, To Fee or Not to Fee: Examining Enforceability of Fee-Splitting
Provisions in Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Employment Contracts, 48 LOY. L. REV. 87, 100
(2002).
38. Id.
39. Id. See also Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. Col., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 1999); Paladino
v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054 (11 th Cir. 1998); Cole, 105 F.3d 1465.
40. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1468, 1484.
41. Id.
42. Id. See also Margaret A. Jacobs, Renting Justice: Retired Judges Seize Rising Role in Settling
Disputes in California,WALL ST. J., July 26, 1996, at Al, available at 1996 WL 3112130; Kathryn
Kranhold, Solo Legal ArbitratorsPut Longtime Leader in a Jam, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1996, at CA2,
available at 1996 WL 11805966.
43. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1468.
44. Id. at 1481. See also Shankle, 163 F.3d 1230; Paladino,134 F.3d 1054.
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B. JudicialReview of Cost Sharing

Some courts, including the First and Seventh Circuits, use an alternative approach, suggesting that judicial reviews of arbitration awards do adequately protect statutory rights. 45 Under this approach, an employee is required to submit her
claims to arbitration and then argue to either the arbitrator or a reviewing court
that the costs of arbitration are too high and prohibitive. 46 The arbitrator or reviewing court would then determine the validity of the employee's claim.47
This approach has been criticized for many reasons. 48 One problem is that the
scope of review for arbitration awards is very narrow.49 When reviewing an arbitrator's decision, a court must find partiality or manifest disregard for the law in
order to overturn an award. 50 Manifest disregard for the law is especially difficult
to prove when the arbitrator does not issue a written explanation along with the
arbitration award, as often occurs. 5' The larger problem with the "arbitrate first
and review the award of costs later" approach 52 is it essentially eliminates the
employee's claim. Critics of this approach note that courts are unlikely to find
that arbitration costs to be cost-prohibitive if, in fact, the employee was capable of
arbitrating the dispute (a prerequisite for judicial review). 3
C. Case-by-CaseApproach
Using a third approach, the United States Supreme Court has attempted to
deal with the issue of cost-splitting provisions in arbitration agreements.54 In
Green Tree FinancialCorp.-Alabama v. Randolph, the Supreme Court held that
the party seeking to avoid arbitration "bears the burden of showing [that] the likelihood of incurring such costs" would prohibit that individual from pursuing her
rights. 55 However, Green Tree failed to provide a standard for "how detailed the
showing of prohibitive expenses must be" in order for a court to find that the costsplitting provision is unenforceable.56
The Fourth Circuit has set such a standard. 57 In Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Inc., the court developed a case-by-case analysis that focuses
on the individual employee's ability to pay for the costs of arbitration and whether
these costs are so much more than the costs of litigation as to deter that employee
from bringing a claim in the arbitral forum. 58 The employee opposing the arbitra45. Morrison, 317 F.3d at 661. See also Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
170 F.3d 1 (lst Cir. 1999); Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361 (7th Cir. 1999).
46. Morrison, 317 F.3d at 661.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Dawahare v. Spencer, 210 F.3d 666, 669 (6th Cir. 2000).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Morrison, 317 F.3d at 662.
53. Id.
54. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
55. Id. at 92.
56. Morrison, 317 F.3d at 660.
57. Id. See also Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549 (4th Cir. 2001).
58. Bradford,238 F.3d at 556.
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tion has the burden of showing that the costs of the arbitration will, in fact, prohibit her from vindicating her statutory rights. 59
Critics have also identified numerous problems with the Fourth Circuit's
case-by-case approach. 60 First, it is extremely difficult for a litigant to speculate
on the amount of money it will take to submit a claim for arbitration, especially
before knowing the identity of the arbitrator.6' In addition, where some provisions
in the agreement might provide for the costs of arbitration to be shifted to one
party based on the outcome of the arbitration, the ability of the employee to adequately gauge the likelihood of success would be much "too speculative. 62
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the Sixth Circuit attempts to integrate the Fourth Circuit's
case-by-case Bradford approach into a new standard for determining the enforceability of cost-splitting provisions in arbitration agreements. 63 In contrast with the
case-specific Bradford inquiry, the Morrison court examines the possible "chilling
effect of the cost-splitting provision on similarly situated potential litigants," not
just on the individual litigant bringing suit in a given case. 64
Statutory claims are meant to have both a remedial and deterrent function.65
The court reasoned that cost-splitting provisions preventing substantial numbers
66
of potential litigants from filing claims would undermine this deterrent function.
To remedy this problem, the Sixth Circuit set forth a new analysis for determining
whether a cost-splitting provision has the effect of preventing arbitration because
of cost. First, when deciding whether a particular provision will deter a substantial number of litigants, the court should identify a class of litigants, based on job
description and socio-economic background.67 The court should then look to the
individual litigant's resources and income as representative of the class' ability to
"shoulder the costs of arbitration," but the court should not do a detailed analysis
of that individual's expenses and bills. 68 Furthermore, when the court is attempting to determine the potential costs of arbitration on the class, it should look at the
average cost of submitting that type of claim in arbitral forum, not at the costs of
the particular arbitration before the court.69

59. Id.at 557.
60. Morrison, 317 F.3d at 660.
61. Id. Different arbitrators employ different procedures and may have substantially different costs
and fees. Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, When Is Cost an Unlawful Barrierto Alternative Dispute
Resolution? The Ever Green Tree of Mandatory Employment Arbitration, 50 UCLA L. REV. 143, 161

(2002).
62. Morrison,317 F.3d at 660.
63. Id.at 663.
64. Id.
65. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991). "The deterrent function of the
laws in question is, in part, that employers who engage in discriminatory practices are aware that they
may incur liability in more than one case." Morrison, 317 F.3d at 663.
66. Morrison, 317 F.3d at 663.
67. Id

68. Id. at 663-64.
69. Id.at 664.
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In addition, the court should look at the employee's potential costs of litigation as an alternative to arbitration. 70 The courts should determine the costs of
litigation in a realistic manner, taking into account that discrimination suits are
sometimes taken on a contingency fee basis, with the attorney advancing most of
the expenses. 7 1 In some cases, there may be little difference in cost to a litigant
between bringing a suit in a judicial forum as opposed to an arbitral forum except
for the arbitrator's fees and costs. 72 The main issue the court should look at is the
"overall cost of arbitration" to the employee and whether it "is greater than the
73
cost of litigation in court."
Furthermore, when conducting this analysis, the court should not consider
that the costs may be shifted based on the outcome of arbitration. 74 The court
should consider the decision-making process of all similarly situated potential
litigants and whether they would be deterred from submitting a claim to arbitration.75 In most cases, employees will be deterred from submitting a claim if they
know that losing the arbitration 6 will require them to pay all the arbitration costs
under a cost-shifting provision.
When examining Morrison's case, the Sixth Circuit used the preceding analysis to determine whether her claim would be cost prohibitive for similarly situated
potential litigants.7 7 The court found Morrison had numerous "necessities" that a
recently terminated employee would be hard-pressed to continue to pay.78 Even if
a potential litigant in Morrison's situation could find employment quickly, the
court noted that arbitration of a "typical" employment discrimination case could
involve costs ranging from three to nearly fifty times the basic costs of litigation
in a judicial forum. 79 The Sixth Circuit found in the instant case that Morrison
satisfied her burden of showing that a substantial number of similarly situated
employees would be deterred from effectively vindicating their rights in an arbitral forum, and since the arbitration had already taken place,
she would not be
80
required to pay any of her share of the costs of arbitration.
Using the same analysis to examine Shankle's case, the court found that a
typical arbitration of an employment discrimination case "would result in costs
between $2,250 and $6,000.' 8 1 Because Shankle was employed as a mechanic,
the court did not have to inquire into his financial situation to conclude that these
costs would prohibit him and others similarly situated from bringing statutory
claims. 82 The court found that the cost-splitting provision in Shankle was not
enforceable because the costs of arbitration were clearly much more than Shankle

70.
71.
72.
judge
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
Id. Such fees are not incurred in a judicial forum. Litigants do not pay for the services of the
assigned to hear their case. Id.
Id. (quoting Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductors Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir. 2001).
Id.
Id. at 664-65.
Id. at 665.
Id. at 669.
Id Such "necessities" include housing, utilities, transportation, food, etc. Id.
Id. (citing PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION 40-42 (2002)).
Id. at 670, 675.
Id. at 676.
Id.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

7

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2004, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 16
JOURNAL OFDISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. I

and would deter a substantial number of similarly situated
would be able to afford
83
potential claimants.
V. COMMENT
A. Relation of Morrison to Precedent
In Green Tree, the United States Supreme Court eased the circuit courts' resistance towards cost-splitting provisions. 84 However, Green Tree provided little
guidance about when a cost-splitting provision in a mandatory arbitration agreement should be enforceable.85 The Sixth Circuit in the instant case provides a
clear86and logical analysis derived from the Fourth Circuit's approach in Brad-

ford.

B. Advantages of Other Approaches
The per se denial of cost-splitting provisions in mandatory arbitration agreements adopted by the Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits is certainly advantageous
to employees. 87 First, it is obvious that arbitration can be expensive for an employee when compared to a traditional judicial forum. 88 These additional costs
may become prohibitive for the employee trying to "effectively vindicate her
statutory rights" and, as a result, allow employers to continue their discriminatory
practices. 89 Second,by adopting an approach that invalidates cost-splitting provisions, courts are, in effect, telling employers that they must pay all the costs if
they want the benefit of arbitration. This, however, should not be a concern for
them than litigaemployers, because arbitration is still a lower cost alternative for
9
tion, providing an effective and fair resolution for less expense. 0
Other courts, including the First and Seventh Circuits, have adopted an approach allowing judicial review of arbitration costs.91 Under this approach, the
court determines whether the actual costs of arbitration were prohibitively expensive after the arbitration has taken place, avoiding the problem discussed in Green
92
Tree-that determining the costs of arbitration beforehand is "too speculative.
This approach allows courts to make a more informed decision as to whether the
83. Id. In her dissent, Judge Batchelder concluded that the court should follow the Green Tree

approach and look only at the plaintiffs before the court. Id. at 681-82 (Batchelder, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, she concluded that the "district court's job is to determine not whether this or similarly
situated plaintiffs have been or will be deterred, but whether this plaintiff can afford the costs." Id.
84. Saafir, supra note 37, at 104.

at 106.
85. Id.
86. Morrison,317 F.3d at 663-65.
87. Saafir, supra note 37, at 104. See also Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Col., Inc., 163 F.3d
1230 (10th Cir. 1999); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054 (11 th Cir. 1998); Cole
v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
88. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 79, at 40-42.
89. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1483-85.
90. LeRoy & Feuille, supra note 61, at 161-65.
Cir. 1999); Kove91. See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d I (Ist
leskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361 (7th Cir. 1999).
92. Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 661-662 (6th Cir. 2003).
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arbitration costs actually were prohibitive because the court can compare the actual arbitration costs and the claimant's actual ability to pay.
The case-by-case approach proposed in Green Tree, and further set forth in
Bradford, tried to deal with the cost-splitting issue with a more individualized
standard. 93 The courts have required that the employee prove that the arbitration
costs were a burden on the effectiveness of statutory vindication.94 This seems
like a reasonable proposition because different claimants often have vastly different abilities to pay for arbitration CoStS. 95 In fact, the Bradford court emphasized
that an individual's ability to pay is one of the key determinants for the enforceability of cost-splitting provisions. 96 The main advantage of this approach is that a
sophisticated wealthy employee, who signed an arbitration agreement with a costsplitting provision, will not be able to shirk a valid contract by claiming that the
arbitration costs would prohibit her from bringing a claim and effectively vindicate her statutory rights.
C. Disadvantagesof Other Approaches
Per se denial of cost-splitting provisions is not in line with the Supreme
Court's ruling in Gilmer, where the Court upheld the judiciary's "liberal policy
favoring arbitration. 97 In Gilmer, the Court "fully endorsed the use of arbitration
for statutory claims," 98 and therefore courts should always attempt to allow arbitration in the appropriate circumstances. The per se denial approach does not
follow this policy because the costs of arbitration do not always prohibit an employee from bringing a claim against the employer.
Post hoc judicial review, at first glance, seems like a logical approach. However, there are at least two problems with this approach. 99 As discussed earlier,
the scope of review is very narrow for arbitration awards, leaving courts almost no
option but to let the arbitration award stand. Courts are also unlikely to overturn
an arbitration award if the claimant has already exhibited the ability to bring a
claim. However, even if a claimant has garnered the necessary resources to bring
a claim, the individual may have sacrificed her life savings or forgone necessities
of life in order to do so. Additionally, courts using the post hoc judicial review
approach fail to consider that the claimant may never get the opportunity to have
her claims heard because she will not want to risk losing the review and be responsible for the costs associated with the arbitration.
93. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000); Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys, Inc., 238 F.3d 549 (4th Cir. 2001).
94. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 92. "Where ... a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on
the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden of showing
the likelihood of such costs." Id.
95. LeRoy & Feuille, supra note 61, at 180.
96. Bradford, 238 F.3d at 556. "[T]he appropriate inquiry is one that ... focuses . . . upon the
claimant's ability to pay arbitration fees and costs, the expected cost differential between arbitration
and litigation in court, and whether that cost differential is so substantial as to deter the bringing of
claims." Id
97. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985)).
98. Saafir, supra note 37, at 95.
99. See Morrison v. Circuit City Store, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 661-63 (2003).
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The case-by-case approach raised in Green Tree,'00 and the subsequent standard set forth in Bradford,'0' attempt to bring a more logical approach to the costsplitting issue, but they also raise additional problems. Mainly, the case-by-case
approach places a large burden on the employee because costs associated with an
arbitration, which courts using this approach require employees to estimate, are
much "too speculative" at the initial stages of a dispute.,0 2 In contrast, the Sixth
Circuit in Morrison looks at the "whole picture" when attempting to determine the
validity of a cost-splitting provision.'0 3 The court's standard does not attempt to
decide the issue for an individual claimant in a particular case.' 0 4 The court recognizes that employers often discriminate on a consistent basis and that in order
for all employees to "effectively have their rights vindicated," the cost-splitting
05
issue must be decided for the group, not just one individual in a given case.'
D. Results and Ramifications of Morrison
Where does Morrison leave the issue of cost-splitting provisions in mandatory employment contracts? While Green Tree did not settle this issue, the Sixth
Circuit's approach will hopefully provide a benchmark for the Supreme Court.
Arbitration is becoming an increasingly integral part of the employment dispute
resolution process.' 0 6 Employers, as well as many employees, now recognize that
arbitration, even with its faults, is often a better alternative than a traditional judicial forum.' 0 7 However, studies have shown that while courts broadly approve of
arbitration clauses in employment contracts, they often "deny enforcement of
contracts that create access barriers to employees."' 1 8 This has and may continue
to lead to situations in the future where employers simply pay for all arbitration
costs in order to ensure resolution of disputes in an arbitral forum.'0 9 However,
this strategy may create additional problems. 0 There is evidence to suggest that
employers are often repeat players"' in the arbitration system, while employees
are usually only one-time players.' t2 If the repeat-player employers are always
financing the arbitration, some critics fear that arbitrators will be biased in favor3
of the employers because it is the employers that pay the arbitrators' salaries."
Furthermore, this seems to cut against the process that courts are attempting to
encourage-specifically, fair arbitration practices as a reasonable substitute for the
judicial forum.1 4 This criticism does not undermine the Sixth Circuit's approach,
100. Green Tree, 531 U.S. 79.
101. Bradford, 238 F.3d 549.

102. Morrison, 317 F.3d at 660.
103. Id. at 663-65.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Saafir, supra note 37, at 114.
Id. at 114-15.
LeRoy & Feuille, supranote 61, at 191.
Id. at 195.
Id.

Ill. Id. Repeat players are employers who repeatedly use arbitration to resolve disputes with employees. Id.
112. Id. Employees almost never have more than one dispute in front of a particular arbitrator. Id.
113. Id.
114. Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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however, because the "repeat-player system" can easily be remedied by allowing
employees to seek resolution with an arbitrator of her choice instead of using the
employer's choice of arbitrator.
There are many policy issues courts must consider when dealing with mandatory arbitration agreements and cost-splitting provisions. In order to have a fair
standard for dealing with these issues, courts must examine many factors in each
individual case. The Sixth Circuit's approach provides the least amount of barriers for employees, yet still allows employers to have the mandatory arbitration
they seek. While this analysis does not settle the issue definitively, other courts
should see that the Sixth Circuit has provided the most clear and logical examination of the issues.
VI. CONCLUSION

As the popularity of mandatory arbitration agreements in employment contracts increases and more disputes arise, the courts will be prompted to settle the
issue of enforceability of cost-splitting provisions. The Sixth Circuit has examined the various approaches and set forth its own clear standard that will likely
provide a guideline for other courts when faced with the same issue in the future.
How other courts will ultimately decide on this issue is not completely clear at this
time, but the Sixth Circuit is definitely leading the way by developing an approach
that is advantageous to both employers and employees. Because of the Sixth Circuit's analysis, employers will be forced to closely scrutinize current employment
contracts and how they draft their employment agreements in the future.
JOHN F. CRAWFORD
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